Tank Battle of Khalkhin Gol

It was the eve of June 20th, and the Japanese headquarters in Manchukuo enacted emergency mobilization of the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments. Soviet armies moved alongside the Manchurian border, preparing to retaliate for the border skirmish between Mongolian calvary units under supervision of the Soviet Union, and Manchurian infantry regiments. A border dispute between two puppet states forced the response of the Empire of Japan and Soviet Union to mobilize their borders.

Japanese Tank Regiment's pushing around the Harzha River to the frontline.

The emergency dispatch called for the tank regiments to move towards the village of Nomonhan, northern Manchukuo. Colonels Yoshio Tamada and Kiyotake Yoshimaru led the tank regiments alongside the Kwantung Army to the frontline.  On the 21st, railway transports began loading and transitioning the Japanese tanks of both regiments, and arrived at the checkpoint in northern Manchuria. Colonel Tamada ordered maintenance work to begin on the 23rd of June, finishing preparations to advance through rough terrain. The long roads had become muddied by rainfall, and scorching temperatures began to overheat tanks as they moved towards the line. The tank regiments were delayed 2 days attempting to make their way through the unfavourable land.


The Kwantung Army decided to cross the Harzha River and to proceed across the left bank of the river. The army failed to accurately gauge the depth of the river, as the tanks of the 4th and 3rd Regiments were incapable of fording it. Lack of communications forced Colonel Tamada to force his way across and catch up with the main army. On June 29th, Japanese aerial reconnaissance reported spotting the Soviet army retreating backwards away from the frontline.

Soviet 45mm 53-K captured by Colonel Tamada's
 4th Tank Regiment on June 30th.

The 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments  were held in the farm of Handagai, awaiting further orders. Due to the lengthy moving north, fuel supply dwindled to critical levels. This forced Colonel Tamada and Yoshimaru to cut their forces down and take forward a limited number of tanks and cars. On June 30th, the group began moving once more to catch up with the moving Soviet army. Report came in for Colonel Tamada, stating the vanguard 9th Squadron had made contact with Soviet forces at 9:00AM. The 9th was led by Captain Kitamura, a close friend to Colonel Tamada. In attempting to engage Soviet forces, a 45mm gun knocked out a Type 95 tank in the leading patrol. The surviving crew recalled that the blast had been made before they even noticed the flash of the gun.


 Tamada pushed his force forward, managing to catch up with the 9th Squadron by 12:30PM. Tamada moved his tanks into attacking positions, while ordering the 9th Squadron to push forward and attempt to scatter the Soviet forces. Eight BT tanks supported by three armoured cars and a single 45mm gun placement comprised the attacking force. The Soviet forces managed to retreat out of sight of the tank regiment during the fight. It was noted after the battle had ended by 2:30 PM that it had just been a scouting force under command of the Soviet 11th Tank Brigade. The 45mm anti tank gun in this engagement had been disabled by Tamada. This was the first tank engagement Japan experienced against a modern military. Tamada noted that after the battle had finished, it became apparent the war would not be easy. The Soviets were better equipped compared to the lacking Japanese equipment. After the engagement, Tamada’s regiment was ordered to stop and refuel all tanks and to wait until the second push was to be called upon.

Type 95 Ha-Go under command of Tamada's 4th Regiment.

The 3rd Tank Regiment under command of Colonel Yoshimaru was accompanied by an allied infantry group, the 64th Infantry Regiment, and planned to assault entrenched Soviet artillery positions in the Manchurian prairie. The 3rd regiment secured itself next to a local lake, and prepared to launch its forces. Aerial scouts reported an opening in Soviet positions to their right. The 3rd Regiment decided to attack there, however the weather took a turn for the worst, and heavy rains prevented the company from pushing forward with the attack together. The battle was delayed until the next day. At 8:00AM the following day, Colonel Yoshimaru was to send his force to the right flank of the Soviet position, while Colonel Tamada attacked the left. Japanese artillery managed to move into a position to support the three regiments in their attack.


Colonel Yoshimaru lost his confidence when piano wire disabled two of his Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks in the open field. One was disabled by anti tank fire from a Soviet 45mm. Captain Koga of one of the tanks that had been disabled by the barbed wire had armed himself with the turret rear-facing machine gun mount and fired upon Soviet infantry to his sides. Once emptied, Koga opened his hatch and fired with his handgun at the Soviet troops. Captain Koga was killed shortly thereafter, but not until he had spent an hour and a half fighting desperately to cover his units vehicles.

The Colonel was operating another Type 97, and with his forces aiding in the battle, disabled a handful of armoured cars and tanks. Soviet troops began to rush the 3rd Regiment’s tanks with anti tank grenades, but were quickly gunned down before they could be a threat. However, while the 3rd and 4th Regiment managed to force a Soviet withdrawal, the Japanese 64th infantry were unable to push forward in time, and both tank regiments were forced to retreat without allowing the infantry to keep the newly obtained position. The battle had ended by 10:30 PM. This engagement costed the 3rd Tank Regiment two of its newly fielded Type 97 tanks, leaving only two left in their possession. The 3rd and 4th Regiment combined had 93 tanks at their disposal. The mainstay being comprised of Type 89 and Type 95 tanks.

With no sign of infantry support, Colonels Tamada and Yoshimaru contemplates their next move. Yoshimaru had suggested a forward assault into the Soviet position while having Tamada support the right wing. However Soviet forces had heavy howitzers in their possession preventing any frontal assault. Without infantry, the tank regiments were unable to find a favourable method of attacking. Colonel Tamada suggested a night attack using the uneven terrain as a vantage against the soviet forces. Most however were against the plan. Tamada had to inform the troops that unless a night approach was taken, the company would perish taking the Soviet position.

Famous painting illustrating the night assault on Soviet Lines. The painting had been present in Tamada's recollection of the battle.

At 11:30PM on July 2nd, both regiments pushed forward under the cover of darkness. Tanks were ordered to move at their slowest possible speed in order to prevent loud noises from alerting the Soviet forces. Tanks were not to fire until enemy tanks and artillery were spotted at a range of ten meters. Seemingly out of nowhere, weather decided to favour Colonel Yoshimaru and Tamada. A thunderstorm erupted, covering any noise that could be heard from the Japanese tanks. Moments after, the crackle of lightning lit the field for both sides. Soviet troops had been met upon tens of Japanese armoured tanks only meters away from their encampment. Japanese tanks opened fire, pounding Soviet armour and artillery without pause. Tank commanders were instructed to destroy rear artillery as their priority. Although once the fighting had erupted, organization became impossible. Each tank and its crew operated by itself.

Damage done to one of the Ha-Go tank under Tamada.

Colonel Tamada knew the Soviet line would not allow a breach, and a Soviet counterattack was only a kilometer away from engaging. Tamada ordered a full retreat once the attack had accomplished its goal. Fuel supply had also run short, preventing the company from staying any longer. The tank regiment managed to destroy 20 Soviet tanks, 10 armoured cars, and 20 trucks and their artillery. Only losing a single Type 95 tank in the process.

Following the massive attack the night of July 2nd, Colonel Yoshimaru had been instructed to attack the Soviet line once more. As no infantry support was present, defensive preparations of the Japanese position were not made. Yoshimaru understood that the line may have been weakened by their night raid, however by the next day Soviet reinforcements strengthened their position. Nonetheless, an assault was made by the Colonel. The 3rd Regiment had been immediately met with anti tank fire by field guns and BT tanks. Colonel Yoshimaru had been killed in the assault, along with 12 other tanks. The Soviets lost 3 BT-5 tanks and 8 anti tank guns as a result of the attack. The Soviet commander reported to his superiors the grand defense of the line resulted in many destroyed tanks. The battle was later known as the Nightmare of the Piano Wire, as the Japanese tanks had been trapped on the Soviet-placed wiring in the field, allowing Soviet guns to easily target their tanks. It was not until much later that the Japanese managed to recover their tanks and repair them.

The photograph above was taken during an experiment
after the battle showing the damaging results of piano
wire entanglement.

The tank regiments kept position until infantry support arrived, and the Soviets managed to once more reinforce their losses. At 7:00AM on July 4th, the Soviets decided to finally attack. Their force was  comprised of 19 tanks (both BT and T-26 models), 20 armoured cars, and 500 infantry. The tank regiments had infantry support during this battle, after days of fighting alone. It came as a relief to the tank crews. Japanese tanks were positioned on ridge lines as to cover their hulls from anti tank fire. The Soviet 45mm was superior to the Japanese tank guns used during the incident. Japanese crews knew this and adjusted tactics accordingly. The battle lasted until 4:00PM, once the Soviet Union’s armoured force had been crushed a retreat was ordered.  The Soviet Union lost tens of armoured vehicles during the entire engagement on the front line. The Japanese only lost a single Type 89 tank in their first attack.

The Japanese line had shifted backwards. A retreat was ordered to reinforce a new line. The Soviet Union strengthened their attacks for the next 5 days. More forces were sent to attack the line - and no reinforcements by the Japanese to accommodate losses. The Japanese tanks sat on defensive ridges and fired at what they could of the attacking Soviet armoured force. With limited infantry support, the defense quickly crumbled in the face of the attacking Soviet army on the fifth day of the assault. Tamada’s regiment began with thirty-six Type 95 light tanks, eight Type 89 medium tanks, and four Type 94 tankettes.

Disabled Soviet BA-10 Armoured Car.

By the end of the assault, only four Type 89 medium tanks, four Type 95’s, and the four Type 94 tankettes remained. Japanese artillery covered Colonel Tamada’s fall back, barely saving what little he had left.  The 4th Tank Regiment and the remains of the 3rd had to leave the line for repairs and reinforcing.  The Kwantung army criticized this choice by Tamada, as they claimed success would not go through without armoured support. However due to days of tank fighting without the aid of infantry, the tank regiments’ morale was shattered.

Tamada's Regiment performing maintenance work.

Japanese military commanders heavily criticized the decisions by the Japanese tank commanders. Due to their ultimate withdrawal, the infantry officers stated that Japanese tanks were useless, and were all destroyed from simple piano wire. Certain officers made claims that despite losing a battle, they remained to see it through, while the tank force retreated when it became hopeless. This view on Japanese armour stuck for the remainder of the war. Japanese mechanized tank units were banned, and were chosen to instead accompany infantry attacks in their doctrine. The 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments had shown great success in proving the capabilities of Japanese armour despite the overwhelming disadvantage in numbers and quality of Soviet tanks. Having success in their engagements, the armour unit proved their worth. However, Japan’s ultimate strategic failure and incapability of establishing proper communication between tanks and infantry overshadowed that success. Japan suffered a heavy defeat to the Soviet Union at Nomonhan. These lessons were only properly addressed after the incident.